This article argues that judicial elections, in the manner they are currently conducted, involve risks to public confidence in state high courts; the author proposes measures to reduce such risks, including disqualification rules, expenditure limits, and extended term limits.
This essay argues that judicial terms of office should be long and non-renewable such that there are neither reelections nor reappointments, and that the initial selection of judges should be by election for high courts and by appointment for lower courts.
This article briefly summarizes and reviews “In Defense of Judicial Elections” by Chris W. Bonneau and Melinda Gann Hall.
This empirical study of partisan judicial elections in Texas in 1976 finds that the electorate lacks the information necessary to make an elective judicial selection system function properly, and concludes that for judicial elections to fulfill their democratic purpose, organizations should assume a more active role in informing the public about judicial candidates.
This article reviews the problems associated with judicial elections, including financing issues, unhealthy rhetoric, and the effect of judicial campaigns on public confidence, and argues that an appointive system is necessary for a truly independent judiciary.
This empirical study of voters in Spokane County, Washington, concludes that voters in nonpartisan judicial elections are more well-informed and more interested in public affairs than those who do not vote in judicial elections.
This empirical study of nonpartisan judicial elections taking place in Washington and Oregon in 1980 examines voter turnout, knowledge, attitudes on judicial independence, and other factors, concluding that States should do more to increase voter knowledge and that highly informed voters are more supportive of judicial independence than are less informed voters
This article examines the effect of ballot information on voter decisions on whether and how to vote in particular contests and presents the results of experimental manipulations that show that candidates’ party affiliations, but not incumbency status or city of residence, have a substantial effect on those decisions.
This article presents empirical evidence that elected state supreme court justices are sensitive to voter and contributor preference when making rulings and suggests possible reforms for restoring judicial independence.
This article provides empirical support for the argument that appointive systems pose an even greater threat to judicial independence than do elective systems.