Scholarship

Lovrich Jr., Nicholas P., John C. Pierce, and Charles H. Sheldon. “Citizen Knowledge and Voting in Judicial Elections,” 79 Judicature 28 (1989).

December 20, 2011

This empirical study of voters in Spokane County, Washington, concludes that voters in nonpartisan judicial elections are more well-informed and more interested in public affairs than those who do not vote in judicial elections.

Lovrich Jr., Nicholas P., and Charles H. Sheldon. “Voters in Contested, Nonpartisan Judicial Elections: A Responsible Electorate or a Problematic Public?” 36 Western Political Quarterly 241 (1983).

December 20, 2011

This empirical study of nonpartisan judicial elections taking place in Washington and Oregon in 1980 examines voter turnout, knowledge, attitudes on judicial independence, and other factors, concluding that States should do more to increase voter knowledge and that highly informed voters are more supportive of judicial independence than are less informed voters

Klein, David, and Lawrence Baum. “Ballot Information and Voting Decisions in Judicial Elections,” 54 Political Research Quarterly 709 (2001). (JStor)

December 20, 2011

This article examines the effect of ballot information on voter decisions on whether and how to vote in particular contests and presents the results of experimental manipulations that show that candidates’ party affiliations, but not incumbency status or city of residence, have a substantial effect on those decisions.

Shepherd, Joanna M. “Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice,” 58 Duke L. J. 623 (2009).

December 20, 2011

This article presents empirical evidence that elected state supreme court justices are sensitive to voter and contributor preference when making rulings and suggests possible reforms for restoring judicial independence.

Shepherd, Joanna M. “Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?” 58 Duke L. J. 1589 (2009). (SSRN)

December 20, 2011

This article provides empirical support for the argument that appointive systems pose an even greater threat to judicial independence than do elective systems.

Hurwitz, Mark S., and Drew Noble Lanier. “Explaining Judicial Diversity: The Differential Ability of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats on State Supreme and Appellate Courts,” 3 State Politics and Policy Quarterly 329 (2003). (Sage)

December 20, 2011

This article examines judges on all state supreme and intermediate appellate courts in 1985 and 1999 and concludes that the ability of women and minorities to attain a place in the judiciary is influenced by a combination of factors dependent upon time and the level of the court.

Huber, Gregory A., and Sanford C. Gordon. “Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?” 48 American Journal of Political Science 247 (2004). (JStor)

December 20, 2011

This empirical study analyzes sentencing data from 22,095 Pennsylvania criminal cases in the 1990s, concluding that the judicial election process leads judges to become more punitive as the election season approaches.

Hall, Melinda Gann. “Voting in State Supreme Court Elections: Competition and Context as Democratic Incentives,” 69 Journal of Politics 4, 1147 (2007). (Wiley)

December 20, 2011

This empirical study of ballot roll-off in 654 supreme court elections from 1980–2000 shows that competition, incumbency, and contextual forces that increase salience and information have an important impact on voter participation.

Hall, Melinda Gann. “Voluntary Retirements from State Supreme Courts: Assessing Democratic Pressures to Relinquish the Bench,” 63 Journal of Politics 4, 1112 (2001). (JStor)

December 20, 2011

This article presents findings that suggest that while partisan and retention elections promote strategic retirement by state supreme court justices, nonpartisan elections do not.

Hall, Melinda Gann. “State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform,” 95 American Political Science Review 2, 315 (2001). (JStor)

December 20, 2011

This empirical study analyzes state supreme court elections from 1980–1995 and finds that court reformers underestimate the substantive component of partisan elections and overestimate the degree to which nonpartisan and retention elections are insulated from partisan politics.