Authors: Kristen M. Leddy, Russell S. Sobel, Matthew T. Yanni
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Latest News
- Why the Supreme Court decided the wrong issue in the transgender athletes cases - SCOTUSblog
- This week in West Virginia history: July 26 to August 1 - My Buckhannon
- South Charleston’s beekeeping ban going to West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals - WOWK 13 News
- South Charleston’s beekeeping ban going to West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals - WOWK 13 News
- South Charleston's beekeeping ban going to West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals - Yahoo
- What does the Supreme Court’s transgender athlete ruling mean for higher ed? - Higher Ed Dive
- WV state school board files appeal to Supreme Court over vaccine ruling - Charleston Gazette-Mail
- Your Questions Answered: What You Need to Know About the BPJ and Hecox Supreme Court Decision - American Civil Liberties Union
- Supreme Court’s transgender athletics decision: What districts need to know - K-12 Dive
- West Virginia case at center of Supreme Court ruling on transgender athletes sparks national debate - WV News
Scholarship & White Papers
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CAPERTON Decision Prompts Changes to Judicial Recusal Standards and Procedures
In June of 2009, the Supreme Court decided the case Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.1 The Court ruled, in a 5-4 decision, that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment is violated when a judge denies a recusal motion based on the judge’s benefit of “extraordinarily large” campaign contributions or independent expenditures from the opposing party.2 Before this ruling, the 14th Amendment required recusal only when the judge had a financial interest contingent on the outcome of the case, or if the judge had participated in a previous stage of the case and was likely biased from that participation.
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West Virginia Court Expands COPPERWELD Doctrine
In the 1984 case Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,1 the United States Supreme Court forever altered antitrust law by holding that a parent company cannot conspire with one of its wholly owned subsidiaries such as to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 Since that time, lower courts have been left to decide the scope of what has become known as the Copperweld Doctrine. A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia clarified just how far the Copperweld Doctrine extends within West Virginia’s own antitrust law jurisprudence.


Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia