Scholarship

Tarr, G. Alan. “Do Retention Elections Work?” 74 Mo. L. Rev. 605 (2009).

December 20, 2011

This article analyzes whether retention elections actually work to reduce the influence of politics in judicial selection.

Tarr, G. Alan. “Designing an Appointive System: The Key Issues,” 34 Fordham Urb. L.J. 291 (2007).

December 20, 2011

This article analyzes the merits of appointive systems and discusses the failure of the electoral system to give judges actual competition.

Streb, Matthew J., ed., “Running for Judge: The Rising Political, Financial, and Legal Stakes of Judicial Elections,” New York: New York University Press (2007). (Amazon)

December 20, 2011

Streb, Matthew J., Brian Frederick, and Casey LaFrance. “Voter Rolloff in a Low-Information Context: Evidence from Intermediate Appellate Court Elections.” 37 American Politics Research 644 (2009).

December 20, 2011

This empirical study of ballot rolloff in intermediate appellate court elections suggests that the variables that affect rolloff are in many ways similar at the lower-court and state supreme court levels.

Streb, Matthew J., Brian Frederick, and Casey LaFrance. “Contestation, Competition, and the Potential for Accountability in Intermediate Appellate Court Elections,” 91 Judicature 70 (2007).

December 20, 2011

This empirical study analyzes 942 intermediate appellate court (IAC) elections held from 2000–2006, finding that while IAC judges are rarely challenged, challengers often prove difficult opponents and incumbents do lose in both partisan and nonpartisan elections.

Streb, Matthew J., and Brian Frederick. “Conditions for Competition in Low-Information Judicial Elections,” 62 Political Research Quarterly 523 (2009).

December 20, 2011

This empirical study analyzes all intermediate appellate court elections involving incumbents from 2000–2007, using data to estimate models of challenger entry and incumbent success once challenged and discussing similarities and differences between these findings and the results of studies of higher-visibility elections.

Squire, Peverill., and Eric R.A.N. Smith. “The Effect of Partisan Information on Voters in Nonpartisan Elections,” 50 Journal of Politics 169 (1988).

December 20, 2011

This empirical study analyzes data from a 1982 California poll survey on state supreme court confirmation elections and concludes that voters use partisan information to structure their voting decisions during nonpartisan judicial elections.

Schotland, Roy A. “Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy,” 2 Journal of Law and Politics 57 (1988).

December 20, 2011

This article outlines several problems inherent in current judicial campaign financing systems and proposes ways to reform those systems.

Rock, Emily, and Lawrence Baum. “The Impact of High-Visibility Contests for U.S. State Court Judgeships: Partisan Voting in Nonpartisan Elections,” 10 State Politics and Policy Quarterly 368 (2010).

December 20, 2011

This empirical study examines a series of post-election surveys of voters in fourteen contests for the Ohio Supreme Court over twenty years, concluding that in a state in which candidates’ party affiliations are not disclosed on the ballot, high-visibility contests for judgeships produce more partisan voting than do lower-visibility contests, suggesting that high-visibility elections result in greater voter awareness of basic candidate information and that this information informs voting decisions.

Reid, Traciel V. “Assessing the Impact of a Candidate’s Sex in Judicial Campaigns and Elections in North Carolina,” 25 Justice System Journal 183 (2004).

December 20, 2011

This empirical study of North Carolina district court elections from 1994 to 1998 examines the impact of a candidate’s sex upon judicial campaigns and judicial elections, concluding that female candidates were able to secure more campaign financing than were male candidates and that it is difficult to demonstrate voter discrimination against female candidates.